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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this article is to contribute, from a research practitioner perspective, to the 
theory–practice gap debate in organization studies, focusing on pluralistic contexts such as 
project organizing. The current debate is introduced, then  the features of the two main 
philosophical traditions (i.e., modernism and postmodernism) are critically summarized. 
Then, propositions to reconnect theory and practice according to the Aristotelian pre-modern 
ethical and practical philosophy are discussed. Some key implications in the following areas 
are outlined: roles played by practitioners and scholars; emancipatory praxeological style of 
reasoning; closing the “phronetic gap”; and the development of “good practice,” ethics, and 
politics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The overall purpose of this article is to contribute, from a research practitioner perspective, to 
the theory–practice gap debate in organization studies, especially in pluralistic contexts such 
as project organizing and temporary–based organizations. Pluralism is defined here as 
“constituted by three complementary characteristics of divergent and/or multiple objectives 
(e.g., stakeholders perspectives [Turner & Zolin, 2012]), diffuse power (e.g., project 
governance [Ahola et al., 2014]), and knowledge-based work processes (e.g., knowledge 
management and learning processes [Linder & Wald, 2010; Midler & Lundin, 1998)” (Denis 
et al., 2007, p. 182, [added by the authors]). Project management is considered mainly as an 
action (organizing as problem-solving) and goal-oriented discipline. “Because action takes 
place over time, and because the future is unknowable, action [and its consequences] is 
inherently uncertain” (Aristotle, 1926a, 1.3, [added by the authors]). This uncertainty is the 
cause of pluralistic project contexts.  However, project management still relies on a strong 
engineering and modernist influence emphasizing predictability and certainty. Contrasting 
this view, as attested by many books, papers, articles, conferences, and seminars… and by 
everyday experience, we observe an increasing tension between demands for relevant, 
evidenced-based universal tools and solutions versus the need to accommodate ambiguity and 
context and the improbability of resolving the ambition of performance as the dependent 
variable (March & Sutton, 1997).  As expressed by Keynes "…there is no scientific basis on 
which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know." (Keynes, 1937, 
pp. 113–114) Consequently, rather than taking a perspective rooted in philosophy of science 
(e.g., modern and/or postmodern traditions), we focus on what practitioners do in organizing 
rather than what organizing theories and practices are. We introduce the state of the debate 
between theory and practice, part of the recurrent question of demonstrating that social 
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sciences and organization studies  are sciences that matter, in other words, make an 
acknowledgeable impact on society. We outline the current debate between what we name in 
a reductive way, modern and postmodern traditions (Miller, 2009), and the prevalent 
dichotomous thinking (theory vs. practice) to better move beyond it, anchoring our 
contribution in the Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy (Duska, 1993; Eikeland & 
Nicolini, 2011). Some main features of the two main philosophical traditions (modernism, 
postmodernism) in organization studies are briefly and critically summarized, before some 
key aspects of the Aristotelian pre-modern practical and ethical philosophy are presented. We 
contend that going back to the pre-modern philosophies (i.e., Aristotle in this article) offers a 
relevant and fruitful support to deliberate on the past and present to create the future 
(Söderlund & Geraldi, 2012). In relation to uncertainty and deliberation, Aristotle noted, “But 
we only deliberate about things which seem to admit of issuing in two ways; as for those 
things which cannot in the past, present, or future be otherwise, no one deliberates about 
them, if he supposes that they are such; for nothing would be gained by it.” (Aristotle, 1926b, 
1357a) Therefore, this work may be seen as part of the recent renewed interest in phronesis 
and phronetic social science (e.g., Clegg, Flyvbjerg, & Haugaard, 2014; Shotter & Tsoukas, 
2014; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997). We discuss and conclude with some major implications 
of the suggested shift to an Aristotelian emancipatory style of reasoning for reconciling theory 
and practice. 
 
Science that Matters and the Theory—Practice Gap 
 
The problem of science that matters (i.e., makes an impact on society), and its relation to the 
theory–practice gap has been widely discussed in literature (e.g., Kraaijenbrink, 2010; 
Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Schram, 2004; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). In project 
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management, a stream in critical studies following the Foucauldian perspective (Hodgson, 
2002; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007) through the ‘Making Projects 
Critical’ workshops, and a phronetic perspective stream with focus on megaprojects 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012) have been developed. These studies consider a 
clear dichotomy between bottom-up social science, and related substantive/ practical/value 
rationality, and top-down natural science, and related formal/theoretical/ scientific rationality 
(Kondrat, 1992, p. 237; Schram, 2004, p. 420), which in turn leads to critically evaluate the 
relation between theory and practice (Blomquist et al, 2010; p. 10) and how to bridge the gap 
between these two. The central argument of this article is that managers are rarely reduced to 
the theory-applying decision makers and that managers only matter when there is uncertainty; 
uncertainty being the defining characteristic of management practice. Therefore, uncertainty 
should have a more explicit place in management theory and practice in order to address the 
gap (Kraaijenbrink, 2010, p. 2, p. 15), and pluralistic contexts, involving “multiple objectives, 
diffuse power and knowledge-based work” (Denis et al, 2007, p. 179), such as project 
organizing and temporary-based organizations providing a sound empirical ground. Aram and 
Salipante (2003) attempt to reconcile the debate between theory and practice by proposing 
that management scholars must adopt a style of reasoning that is characterized by high rigor 
and relevance. Such initiative involves collaboration between actors from diverse disciplines 
to conduct problem-focused research in a specific context and that crosses epistemological 
lines and philosophical traditions (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2014).  
 
Different Traditions for the Relation Theory–Practice: From Modern Practice to 
Postmodern Practice Turn 
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Complementing March and Sutton’s view that “the emperor of organizational performance 
studies is for the most part rather naked” (1997, p. 72), Kieser and Nicolai (2005) aptly make  
the point that the trade-off between rigor and relevance is not solved through success factor 
research (p. 275) and suggest that science should be conceptualized as a self-referential social 
system. This is achieved by (1) producing (sometimes implicitly) knowledge for problem-
solving, and (2) developing alternatives to existing practices using science. Such efforts lead 
to academic research that is relevant to practice (Kieser & Nicoloi, 2005). Lalonde et al. 
(2012) demonstrate that, in project situations, two modes of inquiries—type 1: knowledge-
based, theory, abstract/formal, and type 2: action-based, practical, particular—are intermeshed 
and that there is a subtle to-and-from movement between the “real” (facts, truths, and 
presumptions) and the “preferable” (values, hierarchies, and loci) (Lalonde et al., 2012, pp. 
421, 425, 428). Authors recognize the tensions resulting from the shock between, on the one 
hand, the tyranny of the particular and practical knowledge in context and, on the other hand, 
the decontextualized ideal—a utopia as Thomas More would say, a context free tópos (place) 
to be found nowhere—of formal-cum-abstract knowledge (Toulmin, 1990, pp. 30–35). This is 
brought forward by the modern and postmodern traditions. The modern tradition is concerned 
with theories supporting decision making in response to a probabilistic context (and thus 
enabling some level of certainty); the postmodern tradition recognizes managerial actions and 
practices as a response to uncertain, complex, and socially constructed particular contexts 
(Chia, 1995; Miller, 2009).  “Although the modern and the postmodern are clearly 
inextricably intertwined” (Chia, 1995, p. 580), they proceed from a different ontological view 
of the relation between the “real” and the “preferable”; in other words, being and stability 
versus becoming and change as a normal state-of-affairs (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). This debate 
led to the concept of “late modernity” (Giddens, 1990), although Appignanesi et al. (1995, p. 
126, p. 172) posit postmodernity as a hyper-technological version of modernity. 
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Modern Practice 
 
According to the modern tradition, practice, usually preceded by a qualifying adjective such 
as “good” or “best” reified as standards, is assumed to be informed by a tradition of general 
theories, such as covering laws or statistics generalizations, supporting rational decision 
making. In short, the modern tradition is about what practice is. This tradition is subject to a 
number of criticisms, because this, more often than not, falls into the realm of standardization 
(Brunsson et al., 2000). The debate between the pros and cons of standards and 
standardization notwithstanding (e.g., Brunsson et al., 2000, pp. 169–172), the mechanistic 
and rationalistic theories have proposed that the more the extent of standardization, the higher 
the organization’s performance (March & Sutton, 1997). This is to say that we need to move 
from good and best practices suitable for a simple or complicated environment, to more 
emergent and novel practices relevant for a complex or chaotic world (e.g., Jackson, 2003; 
Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). Hodgson and Cicmil (2007) demonstrate how the reification of 
these organizational objects leads to their naturalization, excluding alternative representations 
or classifications, and provide to this a rationalistic basis for "epistemic communities" 
(Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 435) and control (and the so-called "professionalization") of the 
"discipline" (Hodgson, 2002).   
 
Postmodern Practice Turn 
 
Coming back to the empirical dynamic of facts, various authors in project management 
suggest a shift to a postmodern tradition considering what practitioners do in project 
management context (e.g., see critical studies by Hodgson, 2002; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006; 
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Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007); practice turn (Blomquist et al., 2010; Hällgren & Lindahl, 2012); 
phronetic social science (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012); and new institutional 
theories and conventions theory (Bredillet, 2003). One commonalty among these approaches 
is the focus on the practice as to what practitioners do instead of what practice is and the 
recognition of the roles of power, actors' positions, values, and agendas in the construction 
and use of knowledge. A vast amount of literature, taking its root in the seminal works of 
authors such as Foucault (1977) and Giddens (1979), has been published since the early 1980s 
and deals with practice in social theory (Reckwitz, 2002). These works aim at overcoming the 
dualism between “individualism” and “societism” (Schatzki, 2005). “Practice theorist aim to 
respect both the efforts of individual actors and the workings of the social.” (Whittington, 
2006, p. 614) The three core themes for practice theory: (1) practices—various tools, norms 
and procedures; (2); praxis—activity involved in the decision making and acting; and (3) 
practitioners—actors involved in, or seeking to influence the decision making and acting—are 
forming interrelated parts of a whole (Giddens, 1984). In the project management context, the 
practice turn, strongly inspired by the strategy-as-practice researches, has gained momentum 
(e.g., Blomquist et al., 2010; Bredillet, 2004; Cicmil, 2006; Cicmil et al., 2006; Hällgren & 
Söderholm, 2011; Lalonde et al, 2012)). Vaara and Whittington (2012) make clear that the 
practice turn “defines itself in opposition to methodological individualism,” how “praxis 
relies on practices,” and “how social structures and human agency link together in the 
explanation of action” (Vaara & Whittington, 2012, p. 288).  Brown (2012, pp. 446–447) 
explores similarities and differences between practice turn (i.e., Varaa & Whittington, 2012) 
and phronetic social science (i.e., Flyvbjerg, 2004), and suggests no possible reconciliation 
between them: “…no attempt at reconciliation will be made—any such attempt could only 
succeed by introducing unproductive distortions” (Brown, 2012, p. 441). Indeed there is an 
irreducible divide between unconsciousness and consciousness, immersion in the habitus and 
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hexis (disposition), and between a Kantian ethical thought and an Aristotelian ethical thought. 
However, the limitation in Brown’s argument is that phronetic social science is barely 
Aristotelian, because the “expert” or “phronetic researcher” remains an outsider to the 
practice and this is in contradiction with Aristotelian thought (Eikeland, 2008, pp. 43–44 and 
note 28).  Therefore, the postmodern tradition offers a contrasted classification of perspectives 
with regard to practice and knowledge/theory development and their mutual relation: on the 
one hand, the practice turn can be seen as still rooted in a kind of social scientific spirit, 
attempting to balance rigor and relevance, with a general focus on “knowledge and inquiry 
‘for’ and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice” (Kondrat, 1992, p. 238); on the other hand, the 
phronetic social science suggests moving from a turn to a revolution, a practice revolution 
with an impact on society, focusing on relevance, and that “our knowing is ‘in’ our action” 
(Schön, 1983, p. 49). Maturana and Varela (1998, pp. 27–29) similarly define knowing as 
“effective action” and write that “all doing is knowing, and all knowing is doing.” In Practice 
theory words, Giddens (1984, p. 4) explicates knowledgeability as “inherent within the ability 
to ‘go on’ within the routines of social life.”  
 
The Practice World is not Enough 
 
We argue that, in pluralistic contexts (Denis et al., 2007, p. 179), for example,  project 
organizing and temporary-based organizations (Packendorff, 1995), the practice world is not 
enough to fully capture the mutual relationships between practice (ways of knowing) and 
theory (knowledge forms) for the following three reasons. First, it doesn’t address well 
uncertain and complex organizing phenomena. The non-routine action and decision-making 
process involving explicit knowledge is not the primary focus of practice turn advocating 
“habitus” and routines anchored in the tacit and implicit, dimension of knowledge (Dionysiou 
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& Tsoukas, 2013; Polanyi, 1966). Furthermore, the conscious organizing efforts (i.e., not 
spontaneous self-organizing) in a pluralistic context are in contradiction to the practice turn 
concept of unconscious behavior and ideas such as pure spontaneous emergence of organizing 
phenomena. Second, it is anchored in a dichotomous thinking about scholars versus 
practitioners and knowers versus known. The relation individual–social levels and knowers–
known should be considered in a recursive and reflexive way (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p. 
1198; Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1512). We can contend that “the individual independence is 
embodied in collective dependence” (Gomez, 2006, p. 222), leading us to cool down the 
proposition of the primacy of the social on methodological individualism (practice turn) and 
conversely, considering Flybjerg’s phronetic social science. Third, it doesn’t fully clarify the 
problem of conceptualizing universals or general theory with regard to practical experience. 
The relation between means and ends is not made explicit (see as follows, in the section 
“Relational way of Thinking”) the confusing relation between deontology (duty, means) and 
consequentialism (ends) ethics of practice. Collective deliberation and dialogue about this 
relation, taking into account both facts and values; in other words, theoretical rationality and 
practical rationality, which are the recognition of some degree of rationalization of everyday 
practice and experience, require the support of analytical and epistemic efforts (“epistemic 
impulses)” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 23, p. 46). With regard to the relation between practice and 
theory, the empirical observations suggested by both the practice turn and phronetic social 
science, while claiming to reject any dualism (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, pp. 1241–1243), 
do not pay full tribute to the necessary acquired practical experience as a way of knowing 
involving being native of situations and actions (Eikeland, 2008, p. 35) and not just an 
“empirical observer” or “engaged scholar” (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). Based on an 
accurate reading of Aristotle, Lalonde et al. (2012) aptly address this point in their study, “An 
Empirical Investigation of the Project Situation: PM Practice as an Inquiry Process:” “This 
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work  should be considered, among others (e.g., Bourgault et al., 2006), as a vehicle for 
experiential or in-action teaching styles.” (p. 429). 
 
These brief developments illustrate an important phenomenon: the dissatisfaction in face of 
problems, antinomies, perplexities, and contradictions. "We feel we have overcome our 
ancestors, when in fact we are reworking the very sources of their dissatisfaction in new 
ways. […] Aristotle himself said that right methods in philosophy begin by noticing 
contradictions in popular belief, or conflict between general opinion and the beliefs of the 
wise.” (Hacking, 2002, p. 2) In order to face "the organizational reality, which is often messy, 
ambiguous, fragmented and political in character" (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p. 60), we need 
both to relate the separate traditions shaping the practice world and go beyond them. This 
leads to the quest of Verstehen.  
 
Verstehen 
In contrast to the pseudo-quantitative or mathematical methods, which distort and 
oversimplify, and to the distant rationalization of everyday unconscious practice, human 
action is accomplished by the use of verstehen: “the intuitive quickness of enlightened 
understanding” (Schütz, 1964, p. 4). Additionally, the Aristotelian teleological understanding 
of the world (see as follows—the quest for eudaimonia [well-being, notion translated and 
exemplified, for example, by the development of concepts and business practices such as 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Conscience, Corporate Citizenship, Sustainable 
Responsible Business…], not to be confused with the utilitarian consequentialist “ends”) 
implies to consider individuals and objects according to the purposes they have and the roles 
they have to play (Maclntyre, 1985, pp. 57–59; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, pp. 669–670). 
Lalonde et al. (2012) explain that the creativity in the management of projects stems from the 
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unstable balance between the real and the preferable, between the physical world and the 
world of intentionality and preference; in other words, implying individuals are defined by 
and interact with historical, social, and cultural pluralistic contexts (MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 57–
59). Judging, deliberating, and acting in such contextual uncertainty is a goal-oriented and 
reflective intuitive process (Perminova et al, 2008, p.77).   
This shift of perspective involves moving from evaluative judgments in abstracto based on a 
list of attributes (what practice is), to factual statements in concreto based on what is done in 
a particular situation and context (what practitioners do) (Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013; 
Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997). Consequently, far from seeing the uncertainty inherent in 
action being a tyranny of the particular, of the local, and of the timely to be escaped (Toulmin 
1990, pp. 30–35), we rather see a place for emancipation (Habermas, 1973; Gadamer, 1975) 
and freedom, enabling us to deliberate in a prudent manner (phrónêsis) and to act to create ‘a’ 
desirable future. In project organizing situations, Lalonde et al. (2012) recognize that "the 
relationships established between the actors' cognitive schemas and perceptions of the 
situation, is an uncertain state of affairs. The actors do not deal with clear-cut situations. 
Indeed, projects by their very nature tend to expand." (p. 425).   
However, the shift of perspective, from modern and/or postmodern standards of action to 
verstehen, is not per se sufficient to fully grasp what practitioners do, as it leaves us with the 
fundamental modern and postmodern dichotomous thinking between science and practical 
matters, between theory and practice. At the heart of this is the question of classifications, as 
illustrated below by Aristotle’s classification of knowledge (theory) and ways of knowing 
(practice) forms, acknowledging that there is a dynamical interaction between the 
classifications developed (in social and human sciences), and the individuals or behaviors 
classified (Hacking, 2002).  
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Beyond Modern and Postmodern Philosophies, Aristotle 
 
This then leads us to consider a move from the dichotomy between a scientific (theoretical) 
rationality and a practical rationality (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas, 2010). Moving 
beyond this dichotomous thinking involves shifting our focus from philosophy of science to a 
practical and ethical philosophy, where theory, practice, and ethics are intertwined (Duska, 
1993): practical because the focus should be on the relevance of and to practice if we want to 
make research that matters and ethical, beyond utilitarian and consequentialist ethics focusing 
on material ends (“good” or “best” possible outcome of actions) and deontological ethics 
focusing on the means (duty, “right actions”) and on what one “ought to do,” because what 
matters is the achievement of eudaimonia, an individual “good life” in a good society. The 
Aristotelian practical and ethical philosophy offers a germane ground for this purpose. 
Furthermore, as we develop below, the Aristotelian philosophy is fundamentally relational, in 
line with Hacking’s above-mentioned statement about the dynamic interaction between the 
classifications and the classified: the knower and the known always relate to each other.  
In the next section, some key aspects of the Aristotelian tradition, putting it into perspective 
with the former, are introduced.  
 
Pre-Modernism: An Aristotelian Tradition 
 
Theory, Practices, Praxis, and Practitioners: Contemporary Thinkers’ Limitations 
 
To summarize the current debate, on the one hand we face the enlightenment assumptions 
underlying modern tradition in social science, grounded in the utopic “unity-of-science dream 
of transforming and reducing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and level” and cause–
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effect relationships (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20); on the other hand, the postmodern interpretivist 
tradition, and its “tendency to make all kinds of knowing equivalent” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20).  
For contemporary thinkers, there is little agreement about the definitions of what theory 
(Corley & Gioia, 2011, p. 12) and practice are. However, Boxenbaum and Rouleau (2011) 
aptly offer recent synthetic definition of theory: “an ordered set of assertions about a generic 
behaviour or structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad range of specific 
instances” (p. 274). While Vaara and Whittington (2012), in their in-depth review of strategy-
as-practice researches, state: “Practices refer to the various tools, norms, and procedures of 
strategy work, from analytical frameworks such as Porter’s Five Forces to strategic planning 
routines such as strategy workshops. Praxis refers to the activity involved in strategy-making, 
for example, in strategic planning processes or meetings. Practitionersare all those involved 
in, or seeking to influence, strategy-making.” (p. 290) Contemporary thinkers have 
commented on the concept of praxis and raised there is the risk of losing an intimate 
understanding leading to some dilution of its basic meaning into activity. “All praxis is an 
activity, but not all activity is praxis” warns Vazquez (Vazquez, 1977, p. 149). Adding to this, 
Warry (1992, p. 155) observes that analytic impoverishment leads to praxis and practice 
being used synonymously. We must return to the roots of the concept of praxis and explicit it. 
Vazquez (1977) offers a clear and simple definition of the term when he wrote “Praxis […] is 
the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of the world, but 
is also a guide to its transformation…” (p. 149). Praxis is a particular form of activity, a 
reflexive activity underlying a rational action. It is concerned with change, is present and 
future oriented, and requires anticipation of the effect of action, rather than the interpretation 
of a past or prior event (Vazquez, 1977, p. 169; Warry, 1992, p. 156).  
However, these definitions do not pay a full tribute to the richness of meanings and nuances 
embedded in the Aristotelian gnoseology (Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011), encompassing the 
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whole set of ways of knowing: epistêmê (bifurcated in knowledge forms theôrêsis 
(speculation); and theôria (insight)), páthos (being affected passively from the outside), 
khrêsis (using instruments), poíêsis (making, manipulating materials) and praxis (bifurcated 
as practice, competence development and insight (theôría); and ethics, doing, virtuous 
performance, practical reasoning) (Eikeland, 2007, p. 348; 2008, p. 526; 2012, p. 20). These 
authors emphasize  the limitations of the modern and postmodern appropriation of Aristotle 
philosophy, for example:  
“Scientific methods are usually specialised techniques quite different from and extraneous 
to the ways of producing knowledge prevalent in our everyday lives. This goes even for 
the “post-modernist,” relativist, and constructivist alternatives gradually becoming 
mainstream, which often seem to move to the opposite extreme of making all forms of 
knowledge epistemologically equivalent. But these modernist, or post-modernist, ways of 
thinking are insufficient for understanding both knowledge and ethics.” (Eikeland, 2007, 
p. 348) 
They highlight especially the lack of understanding of nuances between the various concepts 
(virtues, ways of knowing, and knowledge forms) and the willingness to classify these 
concepts as being independent and therefore missing a fundamental point: for Aristotle, and 
for the move beyond dichotomous thinking, in other words, theory versus practice, “Theôría 
was not just speculation and calculation from a separate and insulated observatory”; while 
meaning “something like studying for the purpose of understanding and truth, without 
intervening, and without the study being subordinated to or serving to promote any immediate 
plans for specific actions of any kind, […] acquired, practical, participant experience 
(Empeiría) was necessary” (Eikeland, 2008, pp. 46–47).  
 
Relational Way of Thinking 
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Drawing mostly on Eikeland (2007; 2008; 2012), we summarize some key aspects of 
Aristotle gnoseology. Aristotle’s thinking about ethical and intellectual virtues is 
fundamentally and explicitly relational. The knower and the known and the ways of knowing 
and the forms of knowledge, always relate to each other, enabling to reconnect means and 
ends, facts and values. The ethico-political consequences of the different ways of knowing are 
also explicitly considered.  
 
Ethical Virtues 
 
For Aristotle, ethics and practical wisdom, prudence (phrónêsis) is intimately linked to the 
ultimate end of humankind, which is improving our lives and achieving good life, happiness 
and well-being (eudaimonia), both for individuals and for  society. Ethics is the condition for 
making righteous actions possible, which in turn enable the development of right habits and, 
in turn, enable the development of good character (aretê), a disposition (hexis) involving 
conscious choice, leading to achieving happiness. Ethics is thus practical knowledge rooted in 
experience and “good action oriented” rather than just theoretical knowledge. Phrónêsis, 
being both an ethical virtue AND an intellectual virtue (Eikeland, 2008, p. 53), must be 
acquired through practice and is not just about applying general understanding to particular 
occasions. Aristotle mentions good leaders showing phrónêsis (Aristotle, 1926a, 1144b). Two 
aspects should be emphasized (Kraut, 2014): (1) every ethical virtue is a balanced condition to 
both excess and deficiency (Aristotle, 1926a, 1106a26–1106b28); and (2) ethical theory does 
not offer a decision procedure because ethics cannot be reduced to a system of rules, although 
some rules are uninfringeable. Ethical theory illuminates the nature of virtue but what a 
virtuous agent must do in a particular situation depends on the circumstances.  
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Intellectual Virtues 
 
However, Aristotle makes clear that, in order to fully acquire phrónêsis one must become 
both ethically virtuous and practically wise through (1) the development of proper habits 
(ethical virtues, not part of the reasoning soul but following reason); and (2) when aptitude to 
reasoning (intellectual virtues) is fully developed. This development is not sequential, and 
Aristotle states that ethical virtue is fully developed only when integrated with phrónêsis 
(Aristotle, 1926a, 1144b14–1144b17). Praxis knowledge denotes “a relationship between 
colleagues sharing common standards for how to go about their professional activities" 
(Eikeland, 2007, p. 351; Eikeland, 2012, p. 26). Theory signifies “…epistêmê, that is, for 
knowledge that was stabilised and pretty secure, about subjects that were for the most part or 
always stable and regular themselves” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 350). Two forms of praxis and 
theory (epistêmê) are related. 
 
Praxis1, dialogue and dialectics, is “the way of learning or research, moving “up” from how 
things appear to us phenomenologically to an articulated insight in basic principles … 
searching patterns, similarities and differences in our accumulated practical experience…” 
(Eikeland, 2007, p. 352; Eikeland, 2012, p. 27) However, “critical dialogue needs relief from 
immediate pressure to act” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 29), and “a permanent skholê (leisure - open, 
free space - school) embedded in practical settings is needed, making it possible to develop, 
unfold, and articulate the "grammars" of different social settings” (Eikeland, 2006, p. 18).  
Examples of praxis1 are: lessons learned across projects experience, reflective practice vis-à-
vis the context (How do we decide what is right?). (Bredillet et al, 2014, p. 8) 
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The related form of theory—called epistêmê1 or theôría—“where like in grammar there is no 
physical distance between the knower and the known. “This means that the subjects studied—
our own forms of practice—must be “reified” reflectively in order to be grasped, since they 
are not really outside us or outside our practices at all” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 351; Eikeland, 
2012, p. 24). Furthermore, “…theory as “Theôría” thus becomes a resource to be used in 
action and for action to produce emancipatory visibilisation and expansive 
articulation”(Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011, p. 169). Examples of epistêmê1 are: conscious 
development of reflexive expertise and patterns of practice (involve examining into how 
practitioners are thinking about what they are doing, not just a reflection on what they are 
doing), critically translating and adapting lessons learned to specific situations and context 
(How do we decide what is right?). (Bredillet et al, 2014, p. 8) 
 
The second form of theory, called epistêmê2 or theôrêsis is “based on observation at a 
distance. Theôrêsis relates to external objects without intervening. The relation implied 
between the knower and the known, is difference, distance, separation, non-interaction, and 
non-interference (ex. astronomy)” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 349; Eikeland, 2012, p. 21). Examples 
of epistêmê2 are: using general models to investigate the social or environmental impact of a 
project (Bredillet et al, 2014, p. 8). 
 
Phrónêsis is a knowledge form related to Praxis2. Phrónêsis is ”the way down from “theory” 
to “practice” … the practical enactment is often immediate and spontaneous … but in other 
fields where the practice is not equally standardised and “automated,” for example in ethics, 
the “application” of general competence or of the knowledge of principles provided by 
ethical virtues like justice, courage, friendliness, honesty, etc., needs deliberation or 
phrónêsis, trying to find out how to act in the most just or fair way towards someone right 
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here and now. The point is that the way from theory to practice within this kind of 
knowledge is not deductive, nor does it go by some form of technical calculation of effects. 
And it was never intended to be deductive or calculative by Aristotle” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 
352; Eikeland, 2012, p. 31; text emphasized by us). Examples of praxis2 are: non-technical 
risk management, team management, conflict management, stakeholder management… 
(contextual use of theories and techniques involving adaptation and questioning assumptions) 
(doing the right things, getting things done). (Bredillet et al., 2014, p. 8) 
 
The Mediating Role of Praxis and Phrónêsis: Inseparability Between Ethical and 
Intellectual Virtues 
 
For Aristotle, praxis, phrónêsis, and ethics are inseparable. The aspects of values and ethics 
are fully embedded in the teleological perspective. As Aristotle (1926a, 1140b 6) put it: 
"while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end." 
Tsoukas and Cummings (1997) explain: "There is an internal relationship between acting and 
the standards in terms of which acting is judged, which is not there when producing 
artifacts." (p. 666). For Aristotle, the central role is played by phrónêsis because, in human 
actions, the ethical virtues and practical knowledge go together: "It is impossible to be 
practically wise without being good" (1926a, 1144a 18). Phrónêsis involves "knowing the 
right values and being able to put them into practice in concrete situations." (Tsoukas & 
Cummings, 1997, p. 666) As phrónêsis is both intellectual excellence and excellence of 
character, we cannot be intellectuality prudent (phronimoi) without being ethically good 
(Eikeland, 2008, p. 59). Phrónêsis, as an intellectual virtue, cannot be acquired alone 
independently from other ethical virtues. Thus it is impossible to separate phrónêsis from 
other ethical virtues: “We cannot be prudent without being good and we cannot be fully good 
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without being prudent, taking the particulars of the situation into account” (Eikeland, 2008, 
p. 64).  
The focus of the particulars of the situation leads Tsoukas and Cummings (1997) to ask the 
question: “Apart from being inherently value-laden, what is it about practical matters that 
requires human agents to have practical wisdom instead of merely scientific or craft 
knowledge?” (p. 666). Referring to Aristotle, Nussbaum (1990, pp. 70–75) indicates three 
reasons: (1) practical matters change over time, and new problems call for new responses, (2) 
practical matters are inherently ambiguous,  and (3) Nussbaum (1990, p. 74) observes that 
“Aristotle suggests that the concrete ethical case may simply contain some ultimately 
particular and non-repeatable elements.”  
We can now build on the foundations above established and rejoin theory and practice, 
highlighting important propositions.  
 
Implications  
 
Reconnecting theory and practice according to the Aristotelian ethical and practical 
philosophy, above discussed, has some key implications. For practitioners, “good practice” or 
standards are the baseline set by the virtuoso performers, not just the “good” or the “best” 
reified compendium of shared average practices. For researchers, theorizing is the outcome of 
engaging within a community of practitioners. For educators, the development of knowledge 
and competence takes place through practical acquired experience and perfecting 
actualization, in addition to perception and distant observation (Statler, 2014). However, these 
implications are intertwined. Following, the relation between collective praxis; development 
of “good practice” (standards); ethics and politics; the roles played by practitioners and 
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scholars; an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, for closing the “phronetic gap”; 
and the importance of reconnecting means and ends, facts, and values are emphasized.  
 
Collective Praxis, Standards, Ethics, and Politics 
 
Developing do, in other words, practice and knowledge and competence (i.e., theory), is done 
by entering the tradition of a community of practitioners (MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987; 
Brown & Duguid, 1991) sharing common goals, in other words, ends, will, wish, or want and 
opinion (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87, 121) and ways of achieving them (means, but with the 
underlying idea of doing (praxis) and doing well (eupraxia)).  
For Aristotle,  
“praxis is not only individual, however. Collective praxis is possible when we follow 
common standards, and adjust to each other communicatively, i.e., through establishing 
mutual and common understandings of how things should be done in “concord” 
(homónoia in EN1167a22-b16, EE1241a16—34), as e.g., in grammatical regulations of 
language use, or when musicians and dancers play according to a common score, or 
improvise, tuning in on each other knowing the basic principles of the music and the 
dance” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87).  
Developing “good practice” is done by entering the tradition of a community of practitioners 
(MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987) sharing common goals, in other words, “ends,” will, wish, or 
want and opinion (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87, 121) and ways of achieving them, in other words, 
“means” but with the underlying idea of doing (praxis) and doing well (eupraxia). The 
distinction between ends and means in Aristotle is not an easy topic, and is linked to the four 
Aristotelian causes (material, formal, efficient [the near only one considered by moderns and 
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postmoderns], and final [for an in-depth discussion, see e.g. Eikeland, 2008, pp.194–196 and 
Falcon,(2014]).  
But how are these common “good practices” or standards conceived, developed, and used 
after an Aristotelian perspective? The way of conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” 
has to be made clear. According to Eikeland (2008, p. 25), three kind of traditions can be 
considered: (1) covering laws (deductive nomological or hypothetico-deductive model), (2) 
statistical generalizations, and, (3) standards. Standards can be understood as ideals for 
practitioners, defining what it means to perform a certain kind of an activity competently or 
with certain quality (p. 26). These standards are transient and change when someone performs 
them better.  
Being part of the community (i.e., polis) doesn’t involve blind acceptance of standards, 
conventions, norms (nomos, i.e., laws), but at the same time the acceptance of historically 
developed laws and collective dialogues, debates, and deliberations about them leading to 
possibly changing them (Solomon, 1992; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670; see also 
Castoriadis, 1991, p. 104 for ancient Greek conception of politics).  Tsoukas and Cummings 
(1997) rightly enhances: “…in the social domain in general, and in organizations in 
particular, uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must go together” (p. 671). Thus, through 
praxis and phrónêsis: “Ethics is politics inasmuch as the achievement of human happiness” 
(Strang, 1998, p. 1).   
 
Reuniting the Scholar—Practitioner Dichotomous Roles: The Aristotelian Phronimos 
and the “PraXitioner” 
 
The assumptions about the roles, behaviors, and expectations of the agents or actors, as 
framed by the classical classes' dichotomy between scholars and practitioners (Aram & 
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Salipante, 2003, p. 1900; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 806), involved in knowledge 
creation and transfer is at the center of the theory versus practice and relevance versus rigor 
debate. Some authors have pleaded for a junction or integration between the “scholars–
experts–researchers” and the “managers/workers–practitioners–participants” (Blomquist et 
al., 2010, p. 13; Kondrat, 1992, p. 241; Lalonde et al., 2012, note 8, p. 429; Van de Ven & 
Johnson, 2006, p. 803;  Warry, 1992, p. 160).  
 Following the Aristotelian tradition, we suggest that there is a need to go further in depth to 
fully grasp the importance of moving to consider one single class of actors in project 
situations. Hacking develops the idea of interactive classifications (see, e.g., previous quote: 
Hacking, 2002, p. 10) and looping effects (Hacking, 1995) about “how classifications affect us 
and how we create new classes anew” (Hacking, 2002, p. 12). As a consequence, moving 
from the two classes dichotomy “scholars–experts–researchers” and the “managers/workers–
practitioners–participants” to one single class, we name praXitioners (or “phronimos [i.e., 
wise man, moral expert, embodying phrónêsis] in development”) is all but neutral, with 
regard to a praxeological (praxeology defined as study or science of human actions and 
conduct, i.e., praxis) style of reasoning (Hacking, 2002, p. 3) and to go beyond the theory 
versus practice/rigor versus relevance gap. We maintain that this move away from the current 
dichotomy may contribute to create new perspectives through a new class and open up new 
ways of thinking and acting in project situations. The name praXitioner is both related to 
praxis, and to what Stacey names “reflexive practitioner,” in contrast to the “reflective 
practitioner” (Schön, 1983), “because reflexive practices involves noticing and thinking about 
participation with others in the accomplishment of joint tasks […] Reflexive practice is more 
than reflective practice because it involves people in more than reflection together on what 
they are doing, and that more is inquiring into how they are thinking about what they are 
doing […] Reflexivity is thinking about how we are thinking” (Stacey, 2012, p. 112). We 
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suggest therefore a shift from the “reflective practitioner” and “reflexive practitioner” to the 
praXitioner, performing reflexive praxis, what Eikeland names being “native” (Eikeland, 
2006, p. 45; 2012, p. 11), the “phronimos in development.”  
 
An Emancipatory Praxeological Style of Reasoning 
 
Practice and theory, in their relational, recursive, and reflexive dimensions, should be 
embedded in practical contexts (Eikeland, 2008, p. 47). Both dialogical and dialectical modes 
of thought and action should be privileged for moving away any dichotomous thinking and 
choosing one side of the dichotomy (Eikeland, 2008, p. 48) and recognizing the whole 
dynamic of classification systems. Hacking (2002, p. 4) states that the essence of a style of 
reasoning is classification, “and also something need for thought itself.” Each style of 
reasoning introduces new objects, new classes of objects generating new classes of entities 
(e.g., “praXitioner”), and new onto-epistemological debates about their reality and the ways 
of knowing about them. It creates its own appropriate “very criteria of truth” and is “self-
authenticating” (Hacking, 2002, p. 4).  
We suggest therefore that an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, unequivocally 
rooted in Aristotle philosophy, can offer such a needed holistic approach, and we outline 
below some key tenets of this approach. Praxeology is defined as the study or science of 
human actions and conduct, praxis and practices (Petruszewycz, 1965; Ostrowski, 1967) and, 
if its origin can tracked back to Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics (1926a), the word 
“praxeology” is accredited to Louis Bourdeau in his "Théorie des Sciences" (1882, last but 
one chapter; Ostrowski, 1967, p. 21). A presentation of the origins of praxeology, and more 
generally of works supported by a "praxeological intent" (Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 13), 
through an anthology of historical literature shows the richness of the concept, spanning from 
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economics to mathematics and probability, games theory and economic behaviour, and 
dialectical materialism (Bogdanov in Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 16 and in Le Moigne, 2007, p. 
118) … and its comprehensiveness. We can mention further development in the area of 
education and learning (Pascal & Bertram, 2012), social science (Eikeland, 2012), and 
project-as-practice (Blomquist et al., 2010).  
At the heart of praxeology is the mediating role of praxis as a way of knowing and phrónêsis 
as knowledge form developed through empeiria (practical acquired experience). For Aristotle 
(1926a), the possession of intellectual virtues, along with the possession of ethical virtues, 
enables an individual to achieve eudaimonia. Eudaimonia requires activity, action, exhibiting 
virtue (excellence of character), and intellectual excellence (reason, rational activity). We now 
see the full quality of praxis. It is not simply action based on reflection. It is action that 
embodies certain qualities. which include a commitment to eudaimonia and the search for 
truth, and respect for others. It is the action of people who are free, who are able to act for 
themselves. Moreover, praxis is always risky, because the future is uncertain. It requires that a 
person “makes a wise and prudent practical judgement about how to act in this situation” 
(Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 190 quoted in). Praxis as such aims at the emancipation of 
individuals or communities from the alienating aspects of everyday practice subject to the 
hegemony of the rationalist forces constraining every day actions or activities (Frankenberg, 
1988, pp. 326–327). As Warry puts it:  
“Praxis research requires the development of non-alienating methodologies that are 
dialogic and participatory in nature. […]. Praxis, then, is not simply activity, but a 
specific form of activity: activity based on knowledge informed by theory and performed 
according to ethical and moral principles for political ends. Habermas and Gadamer both 
point to “emancipatory praxis,” which appeals to communicative practice aimed at 
overcoming incommensurable beliefs. Emancipatory praxis is a specific type of moral and 
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political activity aimed at the liberation of individuals or communities from alienating 
aspects of everyday practices.” (Warry, 1992, p. 157) 
Thus, according to an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, we can put forward that 
the ultimate purpose of any organization is achieving eudaimonia (good life, human well-
being, happiness) and social good through “ethics” (Aristotle, 1926a) and related “politics” 
(Aristotle, 1944). Reasoning according to an emancipatory praxeology is thus about knowing 
and acting, on the basis of ethics and politics, from the viewpoint of the development of 
eudaimonia and social good. Furthermore, the emancipatory aspect is supported by the 
dialogical and dialectical modes of thought and action suggested above and the recognition of 
the dynamic and interactive relationship between and within any classification systems we 
may consider; for example, everyday practices and arbitrary versus non arbitrary standards 
(Eikeland, 2008, p. 26), differentiating organizing episodes (Tsoukas, 2010) versus 
recognizing that these episodes being intertwined and interacting with each other, universal 
versus particular, general epistemic accounts versus narratives and/or case studies, abstract 
versus concrete, deductive versus inductive versus abductive logic, and theoretical pluralism 
(Eikeland, 2008, pp. 42–43).  
With regard to knowledge and competence (i.e., theory) and ways of knowing as activities 
(i.e., practice), Eikeland (2008) explains that “knowledge and competence is increasingly 
developed from within practical contexts…making organisational learning in work places 
and all cooperative endeavours—i.e. collective efforts, experiential learning and 
improvement—increasingly important in general” (pp. 21–22). This relation between 
knowing and practicing is also acknowledged by Weisinger and Salipante (2000): "The 
knowing is bound with the practicing of seemingly mundane actions … knowing as situated 
learning and practicing" (p. 387).  
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Thus, praxis and phrónêsis, in their mediating role, serve as the focal point through which 
dichotomies are integrated, and have been recognized as "emancipatory" (Habermas, 1971, p. 
314; Gadamer, 1975), and offering "a way of reflecting on disjuncture between the formal 
rationality and the substantive rationality" (Kondrat, 1992, p. 253). Project management 
authors, including Blomquist et al. (2010, p. 9),  Cicmil and Hodgson (quoting Balck, 1994, p. 
2 in Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 13), and Lalonde et al. (2012, p. 428) have acknowledged a 
similar view. As Eikeland (2008) puts it, which supports our view about the above-defined 
praXitioner: “Only in praxis, not in the study of external nature, the student and the studied, 
the knower and the known, coincide.” (p. 87)   
 
Closing the Phronetic Gap 
 
An important aspect connected to the mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis and to what 
Taylor (1993, p. 57) calls closing “the pronetic gap,” is that the Aristotelian tradition enables 
us to specify how to “reconnect Means and Ends, Facts and Values” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 
1997, p. 668) and to move beyond “a dualistic way of thinking” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 
1997, p. 668) about doing (practice) and reasoning (theory), factual statements, and evaluative 
judgments.   
We need to start from Aristotle’s teleological view of the world; for him, human agents and 
natural things are defined for the sake of some functions or purposes (ends). From a factual 
statement, such as “he/she (e.g., practitioner project manager [PM]) meets recurrently and 
successfully the project objectives” we can infer the evaluative judgment “s(he) is a good 
PM.” Teleologically, classifying someone as a project manager is to think about the purposes, 
the ends, he or she pursues with regard to the functions or roles he or she fulfills or the way he 
or she is expected to behave, “not conceiving [him or her] as ahistorical selves or abstract 
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individuals” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670). Thus, calling a project manager “good” is 
to make a factual statement about what an acknowledged “good” project manager does, and 
not referring to a list of attributes he or she should meet. A concept such as “good” is not an 
abstract entity or category in a classification system, but is embedded in the activity, 
particular context, and situation (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 113). Calling a particular action “good” 
means what a “good” project manager would (is expected) do in the situation and is therefore 
making a factual statement (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 59; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670) 
reconciling facts and values. A direct implication is that the development of knowledge and 
competence should be made, for the praXitioner, through practical acquired experience 
(empeiría) and perfecting actualization (energeia) and not just through perception (aísthêsis), 
abstract, distant, and external observation. We can emphasize the alignment with the above 
discussion about conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” as “standards” (Eikeland, 
2008, p. 26).  
 
Concluding Comments: The Role of an Emancipatory Praxeological Style of Reasoning 
in Reconnecting Theory and Practice 
 
Summarizing the work done by the research network “Rethinking Project Management,” 
Winter et al. (2006) suggest “five [three main] directions in which the current conceptual 
foundations of project management need to develop in relation to the developing practice.” 
(p. 642): 
1. Theory ABOUT Practice (knowledge 'about' practice): Life cycle model of projects and 
project management versus theories of the complexity of projects and project management. 
Theory that helps us to understand practice, albeit from a particular perspective,  which does 
not necessarily have immediate practical application;  
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2. Theory FOR Practice (knowledge 'for' practice): this is a reference to concepts and 
approaches that do have practical application; and 
3. Theory IN Practice (knowledge 'in' practice): practitioners as trained technicians versus 
practitioners as reflective practitioners. This is essentially a reference to how practitioners 
learn their craft, and how they actually practice their craft using relevant theory from the 
published literature on project management.  (Winter et al., 2006, pp. 641–642) 
In this presentation, theory is seen mainly as relating to epistêmê1 and 2 (theôría and theôrêsis) 
and tékhnê, and practice as relating to poíêsis. Furthermore, the explicit/implicit dimension is 
here privileged.   
While recognizing the relevance of these directions strongly rooted in a classical perspective 
(i.e.,  “knowledge and inquiry ‘for’ and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice’” [Kondrat, 1992, p. 
238]), we argue that this work should go further and does not fully build on its argument.  
With regard to the above discussion about the three knowledge perspectives (and to the tacit, 
implicit, and explicit dimensions), we can conclude there is a need for two more directions: 
Theory FROM Practice (including knowledge 'from' and knowing 'in' practice, and therefore a 
tacit dimension), and Theory AS Practice (knowing 'as' practicing) reconnecting the tacit, 
implicit, and explicit dimensions. Extending the long-standing debate that “research and 
practice produce distinct form of knowledge” (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 806) and in 
order to enable a better understanding of the relationship between epistêmê1 and 2 (theôría and 
theôrêsis), tékhnê, and phronesis, we would suggest considering the following complementary 
knowledge perspectives:  
Theory FROM Practice: from bodies of knowledge and process-based standards relying on 
covering laws and/or statistical generalizations (“most of...”) to performance-based standards 
or actionable practice guides. 
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4. Knowledge 'from' practice, (Van de Ven, 2006, p. 805)—tékhnê ‘from’ poíêsis and  
dialetics, dialogue ‘from’ praxis1: with Kondrat, (1992), reversing the classical perspective 
(knowledge ‘for practice’) and beyond the above discussion about “knowledge and inquiry 
‘for’ and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice” (section “postmodern practice turn”), recognizing 
that “What has been missing from our collective conversation concerning practice knowledge 
is an empirical study of practice knowledge itself”. (Kondrat, 1992, p. 238).  
5. Knowing 'in' practice—tékhnê (calculation), dialectics and dialogue, deduction and 
deliberation 'in' poíêsis, praxis1, and theôría = epistêmê1: “our knowing is ‘in’ our action.” 
(Schön, 1983, p. 49). Schön argues that the skillful practice shown by professionals does not 
consist of applying some a priori knowledge to a specific decision or action, but rather of a 
kind of knowing that is inherent in their action (see also above in section “postmodern 
practice turn”: Maturana & Varela, 1998, pp. 27–29; Giddens, 1984, p. 4). As Feldman and 
Orlikowski (2011) put it:  
“These insights have led to an understanding of knowing in practice as the 
knowledgeability that is continually enacted through ongoing action. Such an 
understanding rejects the traditional dualism set up between knowledge that exists “out 
there” (encoded in external objects, routines, or systems) and knowledge that exists “in 
here” (embedded in human brains, bodies, or communities).” (p. 1243) 
6. Theory AS Practice: In a given project organizing pluralistic context, from adaptive 
practice and doing the right things and getting things done to questioning how we critically 
learn in a situation, develop reflexive praxis, and decide what is right. Knowing-'as'-Practicing 
– poíêsis/tékhnê; praxis1/dialetics, dialogue; theôría = epistêmê1/dialogue, deduction, 
deliberation; khrêsis, poíêsis/tékhnê; praxis2/phrónêsis (deliberation); theôrêsis = 
epistêmê2/deduction, demonstration, and didactics. The logic of ‘Knowing-in-Practice’ is fully 
realized through ‘Knowing-as-Practicing,’ following recursive logic between “theorizing 
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practice and practicing theory” and the fact that “theorizing practice is itself a practice” 
(Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1250). We acknowledge here Van de Ven and Johnson 
(2006) and their plea in favor of engaged scholarship and while moving beyond with our view 
pleading in favor of a single class of praXitioner.  
With regard to project organizing, some authors have taken these two directions ('from' and 
'as'), explicitly or not, proposing various perspectives, for example, ‘Making Project Critical’ 
(Hodgson, 2002; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007; Cicmil, Hodgson, 
Lindgren & Packendorff; 2009), ‘Phronetic Research’ (Flyvbjerg, 2004), ‘future-perfect’ 
(Pitsis, Clegg, Marosszeky, & Rura-Polley, 2003), ‘multi-rationalities and cultures’ (van 
Marrewijk et al., 2008), ‘Project-as-Practice’ (Blomquist et al., 2010), ‘PM Practice/Rethoric 
& Pragmatist’ (Lalonde et al., 2012).  
A common characteristic to these perspectives is, to a certain extent depending on the authors, 
the acknowledgment of the concurrent and holistic advancement of knowledge (epistêmê, 
tékhnê, and phrónêsis) in relation to empirical ground (theôría, theôrêsis, poíêsis, and praxis).  
Moving a step further, a logical consequence of this dual objective, for a science that matters, 
is to recognize that the reflexive production and transfer of knowledge (epistêmê, tékhnê, and 
phrónêsis) useful for the advancement of (theôría, theôrêsis, poíêsis, and praxis involve an 
emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning. We can posit that reconnecting theory and 
practice, in other words, transcending the five directions above-discussed: Theories ABOUT, 
FOR, IN, FROM, and AS Practice, and the gaps and dichotomous thinking they each carry, 
requires a holistic style of reasoning.  
While acknowledging that the pre-modern Aristotelian tradition is obviously not the only way 
to suggest a possible solution to the theory–practice gap problem, we argue that an 
emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, rooted in Aristotelian practical and ethical 
philosophy, offers an appropriate support for learning and acting in project organizing 
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pluralistic contexts and situations. Furthermore, we don’t mean that the above discussion is 
relevant only in pluralistic contexts and/or in project organizing and temporary-based 
organizational settings. However, we consider that these particular settings provide a relevant 
empirical ground, with its inherent embodied uncertainty, exemplifying the dynamic of 
today’s managerial practice in context and where reconciling theory and practice is crucial for 
developing “good practice” and for the good of the society.  
Indeed,  
"Practical wisdom (phronesis) […] deals with both universals and particulars. More 
precisely, phronesis is knowing what is good for human beings in general as well as 
having the ability to apply such knowledge to particular situations, or, as Aristotle 
remarks, it is the ’reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods’ 
(Aristotle, 1980, 1140b 6)." (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 665) 
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